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ABSTRACT 
Maritime domain awareness (MDA) entails knowing what is happening in the 
oceans and waterways that could affect the security or environment of the United States. 
With a focus on potential attack vessels (PAV) as threats in the maritime domain, a multi-
domain system of systems (SoS) is needed to exploit and integrate information from 
multiple sources, including sensors, databases, and intelligence, to provide 
reconnaissance, surveillance, and information used in the formulation of a common 
operational picture (COP), which is a tool to effect maritime domain awareness. In this 
thesis, the best architecture of net-centric operations (NCO) multi-domain SoS for MDA 
is determined, employing an integrated systems engineering methodology for analyzing 
and ranking systems of systems architectures.  
This methodology involves the use of process modeling, modeling of an SoS with 
the systems modeling language (SysML), and subsequent conversion of the resulting 
SysML diagrams into an ExtendTM executable simulation model used in a simulative 
study conducted to evaluate three multi-domain awareness SoS architecture alternatives 
in terms of the time to establish a COP and the probability of COP accuracy.   
Of the three architecture alternatives, a conceptual SoS whose constituting 
systems are connected in a distributed network with a high degree of connectivity, is 
found to take the least amount of time to establish a COP and to have a high probability 
of COP accuracy. It can thus be considered to be the best of the three MDA SoS 
architecture alternatives.  
The results indicate that, in a distributed network, which is the backbone of net-
centric operations, direct links between the sensors and the coalition C2 center shorten 
the communications delay, and hence, reduce the time to establish a COP. The accuracy 
of the information to be combined at the coalition C2 center is necessary for having a 
high probability of COP accuracy. Furthermore, the integrated systems engineering 
methodology for analyzing SoS architectures provides an effective framework and tool 
for designing and analyzing complex SoS in general and NCO MDA SoS in particular.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
There are few areas of greater strategic importance than the maritime domain. 
Distinct from other domains (e.g., air and space), the maritime domain provides a global 
transit medium that sustains national prosperity and is vital to national security. In light 
of the possibility of terrorist activities, accidents, and natural disasters, maritime domain 
awareness (MDA) has emerged as a high-priority mission area in both the Department of 
Defense and the Department of Homeland Security. MDA entails knowing what is 
happening in the oceans and waterways that could affect the security or environment of 
the United States.  
The purpose of this thesis is to architect a net-centric operations (NCO) multi-
domain system of systems (SoS) for MDA. Focusing on potential attack vessels (PAV) as 
threats in the maritime domain, a multi-domain SoS is needed to exploit and integrate 
information from multiple sources, including sensors, databases, and intelligence, to 
provide reconnaissance, surveillance, and MDA.  
This thesis employs the integrated systems engineering methodology for 
analyzing and ranking systems of systems architectures espoused in [3]. Developed at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, this methodology involves the use of process modeling, 
modeling of an SoS with the systems modeling language (SysML), and subsequent 
conversion of the resulting SysML diagrams into an SoS executable simulation model. 
This work explains the methodology, emphasizes the traceability between the SysML 
representation of a conceptual SoS and its ExtendTM executable model, and then applies 
the methodology with an analysis of coalition SoS architecture alternatives to determine 
the best NCO multi-domain awareness SoS architecture.  
Three architecture alternatives for a multi-domain awareness SoS are considered: 
A current architecture, a planned architecture, and a conceptual architecture. In all three 
architectures, the Coalition C2 center produces Common Operational Pictures (COP). A 
COP serves as a tool to effect maritime awareness. In the current architecture, 
Architecture #1, the coalition network allows communications between the Coalition 
 xvi
command and control (C2) center and each coalition nation C2 center, which 
communicates with its platforms/sensors via its respective nation’s network, processes 
the raw data from its sensors, and transmits the information resulting from processing raw 
data from its sensors to the Coalition C2 center. The planned architecture, Architecture 
#2, is similar to Architecture #1, except that the Coalition C2 center communicates direct 
tasking assignments to a coalition nation’s platforms/sensors without going through the 
respective host nation C2 center, which still processes the raw data from its sensors. For 
the conceptual architecture, Architecture #3, the Coalition C2 center communicates 
tasking assignments directly with the coalition sensors and processes the raw sensor data 
obtained directly from the coalition sensors, thereby eliminating the need for sensor data 
processing at the coalition nation C2 centers.  
A simulative study is undertaken to evaluate the performance of the three multi-
domain awareness SoS architecture alternatives. In this simulative study, three ExtendTM 
models are created, implementing the SysML sequence diagrams for the three multi-
domain awareness SoS architecture alternatives. The ExtendTM models are designed 
specifically to represent the flow of messages and data that traverse the coalition C2 
network in a specific sequence of events, called a thread. Five hundred simulation runs 
are made, whose results are processed to yield two measures of performance, the time to 
establish a COP and the probability of COP accuracy. 
The first measure of performance, the time to establish a COP, is the difference 
between the start time of the thread’s first event and the end time of the thread’s last 
event. The first event occurs when an Intel alert is received by the Coalition C2 center. 
The last event occurs when the COP is received by all coalition nation C2 centers. A 
descriptive statistical analysis is performed on the simulation results, namely, the values 
of the time to establish a COP. The results of the statistical analysis show that 
Architecture #1, the current architecture, takes the longest time to establish a COP, with a 
mean time of 818 seconds. Architecture #2, the planned architecture, takes an average of 
779 seconds to establish a COP, which is approximately 5% less than that of the current 
architecture. The conceptual architecture, Architecture #3, establishing a COP  
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with a mean time of 739 seconds, shows almost a 10% improvement over the current 
architecture. The best MDA SoS architecture that takes the least amount of time to 
establish a COP is thus Architecture #3. As time to establish a COP is reduced, coalition 
C2 centers receive shared information quicker, which facilitates collaboration and timely 
decision making. 
The second measure of performance is the probability of COP accuracy. In 
reality, raw sensor data and/or processed sensor data are combined to form a COP. 
Consequently, the accuracy of a COP depends on that of the raw sensor data and/or 
processed sensor data. Since this research does not deal with raw or processed data from 
the coalition sensors or the coalition nation C2 centers, a simple probabilistic model is 
used to estimate the probability of COP accuracy. According to this probabilistic model, 
the accuracy of the information resulting from processing the sensor data at the coalition 
nation C2 centers or the coalition C2 center is conservatively assumed to be uniformly 
distributed between zero and one. The probability of COP accuracy is then taken to be the 
maximum value of the probability of accuracy of the information received from the 
coalition C2 centers or the information resulting from directly processing the coalition 
sensors. 
The probabilistic analysis indicates that the probability of COP accuracy for both 
Architecture #1 and Architecture #2 is approximately 0.75. The first two architectures 
have the same probability since both architecture alternatives have the same number of 
data inputs used in the formation of a COP. Architecture #3, with a probability of COP 
accuracy of approximately 0.83, shows almost a 10% improvement over Architectures #1 
and #2. The MDA SoS architecture alternative with the highest probability of COP 
accuracy is therefore Architecture #3. Finally, based on the two measures of 
performance, Architecture #3 can be considered to be the best of the three MDA SoS 
architecture alternatives. 
Some key findings result from the research conducted in thesis. First of all, in 
general, in a highly distributed network, which is the backbone of net-centric operations, 
the resulting connectivity of the network would allow direct or assured communications 
with reduced delay between any two nodes of the network, provided that no bottleneck 
 xviii
resulting from lack of sufficient bandwidth exists on any communications link. In 
particular, in the distributed network of Architecture #3, direct links between the sensors 
and the coalition C2 center shorten the communications delay and hence reduce the time 
to establish a COP. 
Second, the integrated systems engineering methodology for analyzing SoS 
architectures provides an effective framework and tool for designing and analyzing 
complex SoS in general and NCO MDA SoS in particular. Architecture representations 
using SysML activity and sequence diagrams aid in identifying and resolving some 
modeling and SoS interoperability issues, such as communications and concepts of 
operations. Furthermore, modeling the threads (i.e., sequences of events), based on these 
SysML diagrams, aids in understanding the NCO MDA SoS behavior.  
Finally, the simulative study has been found to be an effective tool for assessing 
the performance of the SoS architectures and for ranking the SoS architectures. The 
results of this research are conservative; however, actual raw or processed sensor data 




There are few people I would like to thank for helping me complete this thesis.  
The first is Dr. Thomas Huynh, my primary thesis advisor.  Professor Huynh provided 
just the right encouragement and help whenever I asked.  He makes student learning a top 
priority in his job and is always willing to take time out of his busy schedule to provide 
guidance.  I enjoyed our many conversations and interesting discussions about various 
topics.  I would also like to thank Dr. John Osmundson, my thesis co-advisor, for his help 
and insight.  Finally, I want to thank my family and friends for their help and support. 
 
 xx




The heart of the Maritime Domain Awareness program is accurate 
information, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of all vessels, 
cargo, and people extending well beyond our traditional maritime 
boundaries [1]. 
         President Bush 
         January 20, 2002 
A. BACKGROUND 
There are few areas of greater strategic importance than the maritime domain. The 
maritime domain is defined as “all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, 
or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime related 
activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances” [1]. Distinct 
from other domains (e.g., air and space), the maritime domain provides expansive lines of 
communication that sustain global prosperity and are vital for global commerce. Terrorist 
organizations realize the maritime domain’s economic importance and recognize the 
importance of exploiting the maritime domain as a medium for launching attacks. The 
maritime domain presents many potential targets that meet terrorists’ objectives of 
achieving mass casualties and inflicting great economic damage.  
Today’s terrorist threats place an even greater premium on knowledge and shared 
understanding of the maritime domain environment. One of the most frightening terrorist 
threats involves terrorists smuggling and activating a weapon of mass destruction 
(WMD) using a container ship in a U.S. port. Such a catastrophic event would cause 
massive destruction and enormous economic damage, not to mention death to countless 
innocent people. In a 2003 study, the U.S. Department of Transportation concluded that a 
detonation of a nuclear weapon in a major U.S. port could cost between “hundreds of 
billions to trillions” of dollars in damages [2]. This scenario shows the staggering 
potential costs from a ship-borne, WMD terrorist attack. The stakes are extremely high, 
and preventing an attack of this magnitude precipitates the need for greater awareness 
and protection.  
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The key to preventing a maritime attack is situational awareness in the maritime 
domain and knowledge of maritime threats, along with deterrent and interdiction 
capabilities [1]. Situational awareness is derived from an effective understanding of 
domain activities, which depends on the ability to monitor activities to identify trends and 
anomalies. Situational awareness in the maritime domain is called maritime domain 
awareness (MDA). MDA entails knowing what is going on in the oceans and waterways 
that could affect the security or environment of the United States. All available data and 
information must be collected, analyzed, fused, and interpreted in order to be used to 
provide MDA enabling authorities to better anticipate and defeat maritime threats.  
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of the research conducted in this thesis is to architect a net-centric 
operations (NCO) multi-domain system of systems (SoS) for maritime domain 
awareness. Focusing on threats from potential attack vessels (PAV) in the open ocean, 
multi-domain systems exploit and integrate information from multiple sources, including 
sensors, databases, and intelligence, to deliver reconnaissance, surveillance, and 
situational awareness to provide maritime domain awareness. By exploiting information 
from multiple sources and domains, the NCO multi-domain SoS provides the information 
and situational awareness needed to solve the challenges associated with maritime 
domain awareness. The multi-domain SoS attempts to integrate multiple sources from 
multiple domains to provide maritime domain awareness.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What is the best net-centric operations system of systems architecture for multi-







This research is limited to NCO SoS architectures that focus on the multi-domain 
aspect of maritime domain awareness. It does not consider the political and diplomatic 
realms, assuming full international cooperation by all coalition partners, and it focuses on 
a generic, conceptual solution, with capabilities transferrable to other coalition problem 
areas. 
E. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This research is important in that it contributes to the solution of the problem of 
architecting net-centric operations systems of systems architectures. Its results may apply 
to the multi-domain awareness efforts being pursued by the United States Joint Forces 
Command. Many of the processes and techniques discussed herein are applicable to 
integration and analysis efforts of complex systems architectures in any joint or large 
organization.  
F. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this research is the integrated systems engineering 
methodology for analyzing architectures of NCO SoS espoused in reference [3]. 
Developed at the Naval Postgraduate School, the integrated systems engineering 
methodology is used to analyze and rank NCO SoS architectures for the multi-domain 
awareness mission. Developing an NCO SoS architecture starts with a problem in which 
a mission to be conducted by the SoS is stated and ends with a set of ranked SoS 
architectures [3]. The integrated systems engineering methodology involves linking the 
System of Systems Architecture Development Process (SoSADP) [3] with the 
development of Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) products [4] 
and the use of systems modeling language (SysML) diagrams [5] in representing an SoS 
architecture. This methodology, discussed in Chapter II, will be applied to architecting a 
NCO SoS architecture for multi-domain awareness. 
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G. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter I provides an introduction to and an 
overview of the thesis, including the purpose, research question, scope, benefits, and 
methodology. Chapter II introduces the multi-domain awareness problem, including the 
background, problem statement, and scenario. It also introduces the elements of an SoS, 
including the platforms and sensors and command and control structures. Chapter III 
provides an overview of the integrated systems engineering methodology employed in 
this research, as well as brief descriptions and the interrelations between the SoS 
Architecture Development Process, DoDAF products, and SysML diagrams. In Chapter 
IV, the integrated systems engineering methodology is applied to produce representations 
of the alternative SoS architectures. Chapter V describes the simulative study along with 
the simulation models. It also contains the results, analysis, and recommendations. 
Finally, Chapter VI provides a summary of the research, as well as key findings, areas for 
future research, and conclusions. 
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II. MULTI-DOMAIN AWARENESS PROBLEM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces maritime domain awareness (MDA), the net-centric 
operations (NCO) concept, and multi-domain systems of systems (SoS). The first section 
provides an understanding of what MDA entails and its goals and objectives. The second 
part describes the NCO concept and how it can be used to help with MDA. Finally, a 
multi-domain SoS is introduced as a way to achieve situational awareness in the maritime 
domain. 
1. Maritime Domain Awareness 
Maritime domain awareness is an area of strong interest to the United States and 
its allies. MDA spans a number of issues from missile defense and counterterrorism to 
cargo containers and shipping security, from drug trafficking and immigration to fishing 
rights and search and rescue [6]. MDA entails knowing what is going on in the oceans 
and waterways that could affect the security or environment of the United States. MDA’s 
overarching goal is to increase global awareness and knowledge of what transpires in the 
maritime domain. Achieving this goal requires international and interagency 
communication and cooperation to integrate and share information and intelligence in all 
areas. Data collection is essential and must be accurate. Accuracy provides a filter for 
distinguishing normal behavior from unusual or anomalous behavior, sometimes 
indicative of the presence of threats in an MDA environment.  
According to the National Security/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
(NSPD-41/HSPD-13), Maritime Domain Awareness is defined as “the effective 
understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the 
security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States” [1]. MDA is a key 
component of a layered defense in depth approach that utilizes an integrated process to 
detect, identify, deter, and defeat the full spectrum of maritime threats. Defense in depth 
is a strategy that employs various mechanisms that increases protection by defending 
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against or preventing attacks. MDA is achieved by collecting, analyzing, fusing, 
displaying, and disseminating actionable information and intelligence to operational 
commanders. The following are the goals and objectives for MDA in accordance with the 
National Strategy for Maritime Security [1]. 
a. MDA Goals 
Supporting core national defense and security priorities, MDA serves to 
simplify today’s complex and uncertain security environment by achieving the following 
strategic goals: 
• Enhance transparency in the maritime domain to detect, deter, and defeat 
threats as early and distant from U.S. interests as possible; 
• Enable accurate, dynamic, and confident decisions and responses to the 
full spectrum of maritime threats; and  
• Sustain the full application of the law to ensure freedom of navigation and 
the efficient flow of commerce. 
b. MDA Objectives 
Achieving MDA depends on the ability to monitor activities in such a way 
that trends can be identified and anomalies detected. The following objectives guide the 
development of capabilities needed to provide an effective understanding of the maritime 
domain environment and activities. 
• Persistently monitor in the global maritime domain: Vessels and craft, 
cargo, vessel crews and passengers, and all identified areas of interest; 
• Access and maintain data on vessels, facilities, and infrastructure; 
• Collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate information to decision makers to 
facilitate effective understanding; and 
• Access, develop and maintain data on MDA-related mission performance. 
MDA depends upon information sharing, and the method for information 
sharing is the use of a common operational picture (COP). The COP is a near real-time, 
dynamically tailored, network-centric virtual information grid shared by all organizations 
with maritime interests and responsibilities [1]. The ability to effectively track shipping is 
of critical importance to U.S. interests both at home and abroad. Every vessel must be 
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watched to determine if it poses a threat. The effective understanding of maritime domain 
activities enables effective decision making by authorities, and thereby, ensuring vital 
opportunities for an early response will not be lost. MDA is the critical enabler for 
national maritime security.  
2. Net-Centric Operations Concept 
The net-centric operations (NCO) concept is a product of the information age. It 
benefits from increases in computing power and technological advancements. The NCO 
concept employs a robust network environment (infrastructure, systems, processes, and 
people) to maximize data sharing, which is a key component of MDA. NCO relies on 
computer equipment and communications network technology to provide shared 
awareness of the battle space for military forces. The NCO concept proposes that “shared 
awareness increases synergy for command and control, resulting in superior decision-
making, and the ability to coordinate complex military operations over long distances for 
an overwhelming war-fighting advantage” [7].  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized the advantages inherent in NCO and 
published the forward looking documents Joint Vision 2010/2020 [8], [9] incorporating 
the NCO concept into the future defense strategy. The Joint Vision documents detail how 
the United States Armed Forces will “leverage advancing technology to achieve 
unprecedented levels of power, timeliness, and decisiveness in joint operations and 
warfighting” [6]. The Joint Vision documents further detail how all future military 
operations will be ‘joint,’ including systems and forces contributing from all the Armed 
Services and from National agencies depending on circumstances. This document 
outlines the NCO operations concept including the fundamental role that information 
superiority plays in an organization’s ability to prevail over its adversaries.  
Following the release of the Joint Vision documents, all Department of Defense 
services independently developed and released conceptual descriptions of their future 
warfighting strategies, which supported the common themes presented by the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. As a result, the U.S. Navy would shift its operational concept from one based on 
platform-centric warfare concepts to one based on net-centric warfare concepts. Net-
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centric warfare is described as “a model of warfare that derives its power from a 
geographically dispersed force embedded within an information network that links 
sensors, weapons, and command and control nodes to provide increased speed of decision 
making, rapid synchronization of the force to meet desired objectives, and create 
economy of force” [10]. Ideally, net-centric warfare will deliver the right information to 
the right place at the right time to achieve a mission.  
The U.S. Navy defines network-centric operations as “military operations that 
exploit state-of-the-art information technology to integrate widely dispersed human 
decision makers, situational and targeting sensors, and forces and weapons into a highly 
adaptive, comprehensive system to achieve unprecedented mission effectiveness” [10]. 
Although this definition is specific to the Navy, by removing the references to ‘military’ 
operations, this definition could apply to net-centric operations for any organization. The 
point of net-centric operations is to integrate an entire organization’s assets, or in this 
example a navel force, to maximize the effectiveness of its operations for success in 
accomplishing a goal or mission.  
Since its introduction in the late 1990s, net-centric operations systems can be seen 
both in place and in the making throughout each service. However, this is just the start of 
creating net-centric operations systems to employ more efficient and effective assets. A 
net-centric operations system is a group of systems or sub-systems, designed and 
integrated, that operate effectively as a system of systems to accomplish a mission.  
3. Multi-Domain System of Systems 
There are many definitions for a system of systems (SoS). In this thesis, a SoS is 
an aggregation of existing, independent systems or to-be-defined and to-be-developed 
systems that are integrated and interoperable with each other. Two systems are 
interoperable if they can successfully exchange and process information in support of a 
task or a mission [3].  
The U.S. has a formidable challenge when it comes to maritime security. A goal 
in maritime security is maritime domain awareness (MDA)—to know what and where an 
event is happening in the maritime domain or open-ocean approaches to the U.S. so that 
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potential threats can be dealt with as far away from the country as possible. In light of 
this formidable security challenge, all sensors can make an important contribution to 
identification and surveillance of potential threats. In fact, no single sensor is capable of 
providing complete surveillance or domain awareness; a combination of sensors or 
capabilities is therefore required. Since a capability or a sensor has strengths and 
weaknesses, the strongest surveillance architecture exists by combining multiple sensors 
in a complementary manner [11]. 
One way to achieve maritime domain awareness is through combining capabilities 
and sensors from multiple domains. Multi-domain awareness combines the capabilities 
and sensors from domains that may not normally share information with one another. As 
an example, a multi-domain awareness SoS would result from combining the Navy’s 
ship-based sensors, the Air Force’s airborne sensors, and national space-based sensors. 
This SoS would form a COP to aid authorities in better decision making. Another 
example is a multi-domain awareness SoS that would result from combining sensors from 
different coalition countries, such as Australian sensors, Canadian sensors, and American 
sensors; this SoS would form a single joint coalition COP. The goal is to create a multi-
domain awareness SoS that supports the warfighter who does not have to worry about 
from where the information is coming, but knows information needs are being met with 
timeliness and precision [12]. 
B. MULTI-DOMAIN AWARENESS PROBLEM STATEMENT AND 
SCENARIO 
1. Problem Statement 
The statement of the multi-domain awareness coalition SoS problem may be 
simplified as follows: Architect an SoS consisting of capabilities, platforms, and sensors 
from coalition systems that will detect, track, and counter potential attack vessels (PAV) 
that potentially carry weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in open-ocean transit, before 




considered to be external to the SoS may be incorporated into the SoS to aid in multi-
domain awareness. Example organizations considered external to the SoS include: 
intelligence, shipping companies, automated identification service (AIS), and weather. 
2. Scenario1 
Several seemingly disparate pieces of information are entered into an intelligence 
database. Intelligence tips from various coalition sources indicate a possible terrorist cell 
in Indonesia. Full motion video (FMV), received from human intelligence, shows a 
known terrorist, posing as part of a ship’s crew, boarding a container ship (MV Alpha) in 
an Indonesian port. Another piece of human intelligence, photographs and FMV, shows 
cargo being loaded onto MV Alpha in New Guinea, along with sightings of known 
terrorists observing the cargo loading. When these pieces of information are viewed as 
independent events, there may not be enough evidence to make a connection or meet 
requirements for further action such as surveillance. However, when viewed from a 
holistic perspective, the connections among these pieces of intelligence become apparent 
and indicate a potential attack emanating from the sea by terrorists onboard a PAV with 
cargo of suspicious contents. 
Intelligence information on suspicious container ships, along with their locations, 
is received by the Coalition Command and Control Center (CC2C). Requests for 
information from various external sources, such as AIS, shipping companies, and 
weather, are sent and received via the coalition network. The CC2C issues orders (with 
initial threat data) to the coalition nation command and control (C2) centers via the 
coalition network to track and monitor MV Alpha as a PAV. The Australian C2 center 
communicates with its platforms and sensors via the Australian network, the United 
States C2 center communicates with its platforms and sensors via the United States 
network, and the Canadian C2 center communicates with its platforms and sensors via the 
Canadian network. Each C2 center uses its distributed sensors (national, organic, and 
commercial) to monitor and track MV Alpha as a PAV.  
                                                 
1 The scenario is similar to the scenario used in Empire Challenge 2006.  Empire Challenge is a 
Joint/Allied interoperability demonstration series. 
 11
The coalition nation sensors collect all types of data including signals, 
measurements, imagery, and other tracking information. All the data collected by the 
distributed sensors networks from each coalition nation is processed, formatted, and sent 
via the coalition network to the CC2C to be integrated and fused into a COP. The COP is 
then disseminated to each coalition nation C2 center for every one in the coalition to view 
the COP. The COP provides a common picture of shared operational information 
facilitating MDA and aids in an effort to detect and track threats such as a PAV. 
C. SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS COMMAND AND CONTROL 
This section provides details of the command and control structure used in this 
research. A C2 structure determines the level of command, thereby establishing which 
platforms (C2 nodes) perform command and control functions. Orders initiate and reports 
terminate at the C2 nodes, which determine the flow of communications through the SoS 
architecture. In this research, three C2 structures are considered, which are discussed in 
detail in Chapter IV.  
D. PLATFORMS AND SENSORS 
A functional analysis leads to a functional architecture, which, embedded in 
platforms, leads to SoS compositions. Since the scope of this thesis is to present the 
analysis and simulation that enable selection of a multi-domain awareness SoS, this 
research only identifies the SoS top-level functions. The resulting top-level functions are 
reconnaissance, surveillance, and tracking. Following are the descriptions of the 
platforms and sensor used in a coalition MDA SoS. 
1. Australian Platform/Sensors 
a. AP-3C/W 
The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) P-3C/W aircraft (Figure 1) is a 
modified version of the U.S. P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft. Manufactured by 
Lockheed, the P-3 aircraft is used by numerous militaries around the world for maritime 
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patrol, reconnaissance, surveillance, and anti-submarine warfare. All RAAF P-3C/W 
aircraft have been fully upgraded with systems by L-3 Communications to include an 
Elta Synthetic Aperture Radar/Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR/ISAR) RADAR.  
 
 
Figure 1.   Australian AP-3C/W conducting maritime patrol. (From: [13].) 
b. SAR/ISAR RADAR 
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) technology plays a key role in 
surveillance and reconnaissance missions by providing information for developing 
maritime domain awareness. SAR refers to a technique used to synthesize a very long 
antenna by combining signals (echos) received by the radar as it moves along its flight 
path. SAR systems constitute a very powerful tool for observation since they can acquire 
images independently of weather and solar illumination. SAR systems can image targets 
at extremely high resolutions and long ranges. SAR systems produce high-resolution 
images by using sophisticated post-processing of the radar data.  
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2. Canadian Platform/Sensors 
a. Project Polar Epsilon 
Project Polar Epsilon is a space-based wide area surveillance and support 
capability within Canada’s Defence program. The primary sensor in project Polar Epsilon 
is Canada’s RADARSAT-2 Earth Observation satellite (Figure 2). One of the main 
capabilities Polar Epsilon will deliver is near real-time ship detection, thereby helping 
create a maritime picture in support of MDA. Currently geared primarily for Canadian 
homeland protection, Project Polar Epsilon’s RADARSAT-2 satellite may be deployed to 
cover other regions of the globe. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Artist rendition of Canada’s RADARSAT-2 satellite. (From: [14].) 
b. RADARTSAT-2 
RADARSAT-2, a remote sensing satellite, uses state-of-the-art radar 
technology to provide the most advanced commercially available SAR imagery in the 
world [11]. Using SAR technology in a special ship-detection mode, RADARSAT-2 is 
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able to detect ships and small vessels in the ocean over large geographic areas. 
RADARSAT-2 will also detect uncooperative vessels regardless the absence of emissions 
in the EM spectrum [11]. Once the data is gathered and processed, the information can be 
used to cue other reconnaissance assets such as optical satellites, patrol aircraft, 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and ships.  
3. United States Platform/Sensors 
a. Global Hawk 
The USAF RQ-4A (or USN RQ-4B) Global Hawk is a high-altitude 
(65,000 ft), long-endurance (42 hours) unmanned aerial reconnaissance system which 
provides commanders with high resolution, near real-time imagery of large geographic 
areas. The Global Hawk (Figure 3) can conduct reconnaissance missions in all types of 
operations. Having a 14,000 nautical mile range combined with satellite and line-of-sight 
communications, the Global Hawk can be deployed for operations world-wide, including 
maritime domain awareness.  
 
Figure 3.   USAF RQ-4A Global Hawk high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial 
reconnaissance system. (From: [15].) 
 15
Remote sensing platforms, like air-based UAVs and space-based satellites, 
have many advantages and disadvantages. Global Hawk’s main advantage when 
performing persistent surveillance is its long endurance and on-station time. Space-based 
assets may be able to fix a target’s location at a particular point in time, but usually lack 
the ability to persistently track a target over time.  
The Global Hawk’s primary sensors are contained in the Integrated Sensor 
Suite (ISS), which includes synthetic aperture radar and electo-optical and infrared sensor 
systems. The Global Hawk’s sophisticated electronics allow it to penetrate through the 
clouds during day or night operations. The SAR sensor has a Moving Target Indicator, 
which allows tracking small moving objects on the ground or ocean, and a powerful 
digital camera and infrared sensor, which allows gathering imagery in all weather 
conditions. After collecting reconnaissance data, the ISS sends the data to a ground 
station, which receives the high-quality imagery, and then forwards the imagery to 
military commanders in the field.  
b. U. S. Ship—Bunker Hill Class Cruiser 
The Bunker Hill class (old Ticonderoga class) guided missile cruisers are 
the U.S. Navy’s only active cruisers and the first combatant warships to apply the 
increased combat capability of the Aegis combat system and the AN/SPY-1 phased-array 
radar system. Figure 4 shows one of the twenty-two cruisers in the U. S. Fleet. 
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Figure 4.   USS Monterey (CG 61), one of twenty-two Bunker Hill class cruisers in the 
U.S. Navy. (From: [16].) 
c. U.S. Ship—Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer 
The Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers are the U.S. Navy’s 
only active class of destroyers. Built around the Aegis combat system, the Arleigh Burke 
class is among the largest and most powerful destroyers ever built. Figure 5 shows one of 
the more than fifty Arleigh Burke class destroyers in the U.S. Fleet. 
 
 
Figure 5.   USS Pinkney (DDG 91), one of the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke class Flight 
II destroyers. (From: [17].) 
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The primary sensor on both the Bunker Hill and Arleigh Burke class ships 
is the AN/SPY-1D multi-function phased-array radar. The AN/SPY-1D radar is the key 
component of the Aegis combat system providing 360-degree coverage to track surface 
and air contacts. 
4. External Sources 
Some sources, such as the Intelligence Community, Automated Identification 
System, and various databases, are considered to be external to the MDA SoS. 
a. Intelligence Community  
The Intelligence Community (IC) is a federation of executive branch 
agencies and organizations that conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct 
of foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the U.S. [18]. The IC 
organizes and manages the collection of intelligence from various sources or disciplines. 
For example, an intelligence gathering discipline, which collects information via remote 
sensing satellite and aerial photography, is known as imagery intelligence. Other 
common intelligence gathering disciplines include signals intelligence and human 
intelligence.  
b. Automatic Identification System 
The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is a system used by ships in 
the shipping industry for locating and identifying vessels. The AIS provides a means for 
ships to electronically exchange ship data, such as identification, position, course, and 
speed, with other nearby ships and vessel traffic service (VTS) transponder stations. 
Since the AIS is only required for ships larger than 300 gross tons, smaller craft and non-
cooperative vessels are not captured by the AIS system. Figure 6 is an illustration of an 
AIS system concept. 
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Figure 6.   AIS Network depiction showing data exchange between ships and VTS 
stations. (From: [19].) 
Originally intended for collision avoidance, the AIS, along with the VTS 
transponder system, is proving to be a valuable asset to identify ships in SAR imagery, 
especially as future space systems become capable of receiving and interpreting the AIS 
signals from space. 
c. Commercial, Industry, and Open Source Databases 
Various databases, both commercial and open source, contain a 
voluminous amount of information that could potentially aid in profiling and identifying 
PAVs and cargo. For example, cargo from a country known to harbor terrorists could 
raise a warning flag. Since ships are supposed to document their cargo contents, perhaps 
containers with odd routings or ships with suspicious manifests would raise a different 
warning flag. Among several commercial and open source databases that could provide 
invaluable information for maritime awareness, Lloyd’s MIU offers services that track 
vessel movement data, and provides AIS movements, casualty and characteristics data, as 
well as a huge database of 163,500 shipping companies [20]. 
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E. SUMMARY 
This chapter defines maritime domain awareness, discusses the net-centric 
operations concept, and explains multi-domain system of systems. It then defines the 
multi-domain awareness problem statement and scenario. Finally, it describes the assets 
available to contribute to an MDA SoS.  The next chapter provides an overview of the 
integrated systems engineering methodology employed in this research, as well as brief 
descriptions and the interrelations between the SoS Architecture Development Process, 
DoDAF products, and SysML diagrams. 
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III. INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The integrated systems engineering methodology for performing engineering 
analyses of systems of systems, developed at the Naval Postgraduate School [3], [21], 
[22], has been successfully applied to example military systems of systems [3], [23]. The 
integrated systems engineering methodology applies to systems of systems formed by 
systems that have previously been independently developed as stand-alone systems. An 
elaboration of the integrated systems engineering methodology follows. 
1. SoS Systems Engineering 
Systems of systems engineering is the design, development, and operation of a 
system of stand-alone systems that provides functions the stand-alone systems cannot 
provide [24]. Many existing systems alone can be considered complex systems. However, 
future demands require these systems be engineered to function as an integrated system 
of systems (SoS). An SoS is defined as “a conglomeration of existing, stand-alone 
systems or to-be-defined and to-be-evaluated systems that are integrated and 
interoperable with each other” [3]. Two systems are interoperable if they can successfully 
exchange and process information in support of a task or mission.  
2. Systems Engineering Methodology for Analyzing SoS 
An SoS systems engineering problem involves analysis of existing and proposed 
systems of systems architectures as well as of architectures of complex systems-of-
systems [22], [23]. Processes are a series of actions undertaken to produce products, 
services, or other end results used by systems. The integrated systems engineering 
methodology is a process modeling methodology for performing engineering analysis for 
systems of systems [21]. The methodology was first developed using the unified 
modeling language (UML) for systems modeling. It then used the systems modeling 
language (SysML) to take advantage of the features offered by SysML [3], [25], [26].  
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3. Integrated Systems Engineering Methodology 
The integrated systems engineering methodology is an integrated methodology 
for analyzing SoS architectures, using modeling and simulation, and provides traceability 
between executable models and the SoS architecture. The methodology unites and 
integrates three parts into a unified paradigm for analysis of SoS architectures. The three 
parts of the integrated systems engineering methodology are [3], [23]: 
• SoS Architecture Development Process (SoSADP); 
• Department of Defense (DoD) Architecture Framework (DoDAF); and 
• SysML. 
The SoSADP2 is a framework for assessing SoS architectures using modeling and 
simulation. A logical, systemic, layered process, the SoSADP starts with the needs for a 
SoS and ends with SoS architectures assessed and ranked using modeling and simulation. 
The DoDAF defines a common approach for DoD architectural description development, 
presentation, and integration [27], [28]. The integrated systems engineering methodology 
integrates the SoSADP with the development of the DoDAF products and SysML 
diagrams in representing an SoS architecture.  
The SoSADP is further explained in Section B, followed by the DoDAF and 
DoDAF products in Section C, SysML in Section D, and finally, the unified paradigm or 
mapping in Section E.  
B. SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
This section is excerpted from Huynh and Osmundson [3]. The first part of the 
SoS systems engineering methodology is the SoSADP. A logical, layered process, the 
SoSADP provides a framework for assessing SoS architectures. Figure 7 captures the 
SoSADP with the processes within a layer supporting the processes in the layer 
immediately above. The connectors in red depict the support relationships—from a lower 
layer to an upper layer—while those in blue show the local (within a layer) relationships. 
                                                 
2 Developed by Dr. Thomas Huynh while at Lockheed Martin (circa 2001), the SoSADP has been 
adopted and modified for use in the Systems Engineering Department for projects at NPS. 
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The SoSADP starts with the SoS problem and ends with ranked SoS architectures. As 
with any systems engineering process, the iterative nature is also inherent in the 
SoSADP. Each SoSADP layer is described in greater detail below. 
 
Figure 7.   The layered structure of the SoS architecture development process 
(SoSADP) (From: [3].) 
1. SoS Problem 
The SoS problem statement is a description of the SoS that needs to be built and 
sets in motion the SoSADP. The SoS problem statement provides missions, threats, 
unilateral or coalition undertakings, timeframes, geographical settings, needs for an SoS, 
and constraints. 
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2. Mission Analysis 
Mission analysis consists of determining the threats (Determine Threats3), 
defining scenarios (Define Scenarios), and refining the missions (Determine Missions). A 
scenario includes the threats, their signatures, their trajectories, etc., the deployment of 
the defense forces, and the physical environment in which the mission takes place or is 
executed. 
3. Needs Analysis 
The needs analysis layer is built upon the output of the Define Missions in the 
Missions Analysis layer. Analyze SoS Needs ascertains what functions the SoS must 
perform to execute the mission(s). Develop MOEs (measures of effectiveness) establishes 
how well the SoS must do to support the mission(s). 
4. Requirements Analysis 
The requirements analysis layer is built upon the output from the needs analysis 
layer. Perform Requirements Analysis is realized by Perform Operational Requirements 
Analysis, Perform Functional Analysis, and Perform Non-functional Analysis, all of 
which use the output from Analyze SoS Needs. Perform Operational Requirements 
Analysis provides operational requirements. Perform Functional Analysis results in a 
functional description of the SoS and all facets of SoS operations and support and is 
accomplished through functional decomposition and allocation and development of 
functional flow diagrams. Perform Non-functional Analysis provides quantitative 
requirements. Flowdown Requirements is then performed using the results from Perform 
Requirements Analysis. Finally, Develop MOPs (measures of performance) uses the 
output from the Develop MOEs. 
                                                 
3 Italicized phrases in this section denote processes. 
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5. SoS Architecture Alternatives 
The requirements analysis layer supports the SoS Architecture Alternatives layer. 
Identify Critical Elements, Perform Functional Embedding, Define SoS Communications 
Structures, and Define SoS C2 (command and control) Structures use the output from 
Flowdown Requirements and Develop MOPs from the layer immediately below. Perform 
Functional Embedding allocates functions to systems that make up the SoS. Identify 
Critical Elements establishes critical elements of the desired SoS. Identify Existing 
Systems identifies current systems with the required capabilities. Postulate Future 
Systems proposes future system elements. The results of Define SoS Communications 
Structures, Define SoS C2 Structures, and Define SoS Architecture Options aid in the 
definition of the concept of operations (CONOPS) in Define CONOPS. Define SoS 
Communication Structures establishes different communication structures. Define SoS C2 
Structures establishes different command and control structures. SoS Force Composition 
Options uses system elements and outputs of Perform Functional Analysis to define 
various for composition options. Define SoS Architecture Options generates SoS 
architectures using outputs from SoS Force Composition, Define SoS Communication 
Structures, and Define SoS C2 Structures. Develop Threads with Data & Messages uses 
the results from Define SoS Architecture Options and Define CONOPS.  
6. Cost and Risk Analysis 
The SoS architecture alternatives layer supports the cost and risk analysis layer. 
Estimate Cost and Identify Risks provide the total cost and the risks associated with the 
different SoS architecture alternatives.  
7. SoS Architecture Ranking 
Perform M&S (modeling and simulation) models the SoS used in simulation to 
aid Conduct Performance Analysis in assessing the performance of the SoS architecture 
alternatives. Select SoS selects the best SoS architecture. Rank SoS Architecture 
Alternatives ranks the SoS architecture alternatives, using the estimated MOPs and 
MOEs, costs, and risk factors. 
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C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ARCHITECTURE FRAMEWORK 
The second part of the SoS systems engineering methodology is the DoDAF and 
its products. This section starts by briefly describing the difference between architecture 
and an architecture framework. It is important to understand the difference before 
describing the specifics of the DoDAF. This is followed by an overview of the DoDAF, 
specifically its purpose, views, and products. 
1. Architectures and Architecture Frameworks 
According to IEEE STD 1471-2000,4 architecture is defined as “the fundamental 
organization of a system embodied in its components, their relationships to each other, 
and to the environment, and the principles guiding its design and evolution” [29]. 
Architecture represents or describes a defined domain, at a current or future point in time, 
in terms of building blocks, how those blocks function, the rules and constraints under 
which those blocks function, and how those blocks relate to each other and to the 
environment [28]. An architecture framework, on the other hand, provides guidance and 
rules for structuring, classifying, and organizing architectures. An architecture framework 
is a tool that describes a method for designing a system in terms of a set of building 
blocks, showing how the building blocks fit together. An architecture framework 
provides a common vocabulary and a list of recommended standards and compliant 
products that can be used to implement the building blocks [28]. The DoDAF, for 
example, provides the U.S. defense industry a foundation or guidance to ensure system 
standards and interoperability. 
The architecture framework (Figure 8) consists of two layers: data and 
presentation. The data layer contains the architecture data elements and their defining 
attributes and relationships. The presentation layer contains the products and views that 
support a visual means to communicate and understand the purpose of the architecture, 
what it describes, and the various architectural analyses performed. Products provide a 
                                                 
4 Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) is one of the leading standards-making 
organizations in the world. IEEE STD 1471-2000 is the Recommended Practice for Architecture 
Description of Software-Intensive Systems. 
 27
way for visualizing architecture data as graphical, tabular, or textual representations. 
Views provide the ability to visualize architecture data that stem across products, 
logically organizing the data for a specific or holistic perspective of the architecture [28].  
 
 
Figure 8.   Architecture Framework Structure (From: [4].) 
2. DoDAF Purpose  
The purpose of the DoDAF is to provide guidance for describing DoD 
architectures for both warfighting and business operations and processes. DoDAF defines 
a common approach for DoD architectural description development, presentation, and 
integration; thus establishing a common denominator for understanding, comparing, and 
integrating architectures across organizational, Joint, and multinational boundaries. 
DoDAF version 1.5, responding to the DoD’s migration towards NCO, applies net-
centric concepts by placing more emphasis on architecture data to facilitate more efficient 
and flexible use and reuse of architecture data, enabling broader utility for decision 
makers and process owners [30]. 
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3. DoDAF Views 
The DoDAF provides an integrated architecture with data elements that are 
uniquely identified and consistently used across all products and views within the 
architecture. In most cases, an integrated architecture description has an Operational 
View (OV), Systems and Services View (SV), Technical Standards View (TV), and an 
All View (AV) that are integrated with each other. Figure 9 represents the information 
that links the operational view, systems and services view, and technical standards view, 
also showing there are common points of reference linking the OV and SV and also 
linking the SV and TV. The following definitions of OV, SV, TV, and AV are excerpted 
from the DoDAF v1.5.  
 
Figure 9.   Fundamental Linkages among Views. (From: [4].) 
a. Definition of the Operational View (OV) 
The Operational View captures the operational nodes, the tasks or 
activities performed, and the information that must be exchanged to accomplish DoD 
missions. The OV conveys the types of information exchanged, the frequency of 
exchange, which tasks and activities are supported by the information exchanges, and the 
nature of information exchanges [28]. 
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b. Definition of the Systems and Services View (SV) 
The Systems and Services View captures system, service, and 
interconnection functionality providing for, or supporting, operational activities. DoD 
processes include warfighting, business, intelligence, and infrastructure functions. The 
SV system functions and service resources and components may be linked to the 
architecture artifacts in the OV. These system functions and service resources support the 
operational activities and facilitate the exchange of information among operational nodes 
[28]. 
c. Definition of Technical Standards View (TV) 
The Technical Standards View is the set of rules governing the 
arrangement, interaction, and interdependence of system parts or elements. The TV’s 
purpose is to ensure that a system satisfies a specified set of operational requirements. 
The TV provides the technical systems implementation guidelines upon which 
engineering specifications are based, common building blocks are established, and 
product lines are developed. It includes a collection of the technical standards, 
implementation conventions, standards options, rules, and criteria that can be organized 
into profiles(s) that govern systems and system or service elements for a given 
architecture [28]. 
d. Definition of All View (AV) 
The All View relates some overarching aspects of an architecture that may 
cross all three views. These overarching aspects are captured in the AV products. The AV 
products provide information pertinent to the entire architecture but do not represent a 
distinct view of the architecture. AV products set the scope and context of the 
architecture. The scope includes the subject area and time frame for the architecture. The 
setting in which the architecture exists comprises the interrelated conditions that compose 
the context for the architecture. These conditions include doctrine; tactics, techniques, 
and procedures; relevant goals and vision statements; concepts of operation (CONOPS); 
scenarios; and environmental conditions [28]. 
 30
4. DoDAF Products 
The DoDAF products describe characteristics pertinent to the architecture purpose 
through graphical, textual, and tabular forms.  Each view consists of architecture 
products, which are interrelated within a view as well as across views. Table 1 lists the 
architecture products for each view, as defined in DoDAF v1.5.  
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The first column indicates the view applicable to each product. The second 
column provides an alphanumeric reference identifier for each product. The third column 
gives the formal name of the product. The fourth column indicates if the product’s 
definition and purpose are augmented to incorporate net-centric concepts. The fifth 
column captures the general nature of the product’s content. The sequence of products in 
the table does not imply a sequence for developing the products. However, an implied 
support structure does exist among the products, albeit developed iteratively, which 
captures the views and the products in a layered construct depicted in Figure 10 [3]. 
Again, the lower layer supports the layer immediately above it. The AV supports the OV, 
which supports the SV, which supports the TV. The arrows in red indicate the 
connections between layers. The arrows in other colors are local to the layers to which 
they belong.  
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Figure 10.   The layered structure depicting the interrelations among the DoDAF views 
and their associated architecture products. (From: [3].) 
This thesis is confined to a multi-domain awareness SoS architecture that is 
integrated and NCOW-compliant. An integrated, NCOW-compliant SoS architecture 
requires twelve DoDAF products, at a minimum [27]: AV-1, AV-2, OV-2, OV-3, OV-5, 
SV-1, TV-1, together with the products required by NCOW, OV-1, SV-2, SV-3, SV-4, 
and SV-5.  
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D. SYSTEMS MODELING LANGUAGE (SYSML) 
1. SysML Introduction 
Systems Modeling Language (SysML) is a general-purpose graphical modeling 
language for specifying, analyzing, designing, and verifying all types of complex 
systems. SysML uses graphical representations, which are effective in specifying system 
requirements, system structure, functional behavior, and parametrics during the 
specification and design phases of a systems engineering problem. SysML is designed to 
provide simple yet powerful models that aid in solving a variety of systems engineering 
problems.  
SysML is defined as an extension of a subset of the Unified Modeling Language 
(UML). SysML reuses a subset of UML and provides additional extensions needed to 
satisfy the requirements in UML for the systems engineering domain. The Venn diagram 
(Figure 11) shows the visual relationship between the UML and SysML languages, where 
the large circles represent the set of language constructs that comprise UML and SysML, 
respectively. The intersection of the two circles, shown in the shaded region, indicates the 
UML modeling constructs that SysML reuses [5]. 
 
Figure 11.   Overview of SysML/UML interrelationship. (From: [5].) 
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There are advantages that may be gained by using SysML over UML when 
modeling systems. SysML can be used for representing systems and product 
architectures, as well as their behavior and functionality. For example, the SysML 
Requirements diagrams efficiently capture a system’s functional, performance, and 
interface requirements; however, there are limitations to define high-level functional 
requirements using UML Use Case diagrams. Also, SysML Parametric diagrams are used 
to define performance and mechanical constraints, but UML does not provide any direct 
mechanism to capture essential performance and mechanical information.  
2. SysML Diagrams 
SysML uses a variety of diagrams with a semantic foundation to represent 
complex systems. SysML modifies some existing UML constructs and adds specialized 
constructs to address unique systems engineering requirements. Figure 12 shows an 
example of the SysML diagram taxonomy. A diagram taxonomy makes it easier to 
visualize how SysML reuses or modifies many of the existing UML diagram types, and 
adds new diagram types when additional requirements or constructs arise. 
 
 
Figure 12.   SysML Diagram Taxonomy. (From: [5].) 
A SysML diagram represents a model element and has a diagram frame with a 
header. The header displays diagram kind, model element type, model element name, and 
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descriptive diagram name or view name. A diagram kind can be labeled ‘act’ for activity, 
‘bdd’ for block definition diagram, ‘ibd’ for internal block diagram, etc. A model element 




Figure 13.   SysML diagram frame. (From: [5].) 
The following six SysML diagram types are briefly defined. They are later used in 
this thesis to represent the SoS architecture. Their descriptions come from to the OMG 
Systems Modeling Language (OMG SysML) specification [5]. For more information 
concerning the SysML diagrams or SysML in general, refer to the OMG SysML 
specification. 
a. Context Diagram 
The context diagram is simple in nature, yet it is one of the most important 
diagrams when modeling a system. One of the most important tasks surrounding a 
systems engineering problem is to decide what belongs to the system and what is external 
to the system. The context diagram is an informal way to represent the boundaries of the 
system.  
b. Use Case Diagram 
The use case diagram describes the usage of a system by its environment 
to achieve a goal. The environment includes actors, which the system may be providing 
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services to or getting services from that are external to the system. The use case can also 
show the functionality and/or capabilities of the system through the interactions between 
the system and its actors, including communications that may occur among them. 
c. Requirements Diagram 
The requirements diagram displays requirements, packages, other 
classifiers, test cases, and rationale. The requirement specifies a capability or condition 
that must be met or satisfied. It can depict the requirements in graphical, tabular, or tree 
structure format. This diagram is one of the modeling constructs intended to provide a 
bridge between traditional requirements management tools and other SysML models [5].  
d. Activity Diagram 
The activity diagram graphically models the inputs, outputs, sequences, 
and conditions for coordinating other behaviors. Activity diagrams provide a flexible link 
to the blocks owning those behaviors. 
e. Sequence Diagram 
The sequence diagram describes the flow of control between actors and 
parts of the system. It also represents both communication and timing among entities, 
where time is represented on the vertical axis. For example, the interactions could 
represent the sending and receiving of messages between interacting entities. 
f. Block Definition (Breakdown) Diagram 
The block breakdown diagram in SysML defines features of blocks and 
relationships between blocks such as associations, generalizations, and dependencies. It 
defines a decomposition of the activities and object flows from an activity diagram. 
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E. INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN SOSADP, DODAF PRODUCTS, AND 
SYSML DIAGRAMS 
The mapping between the SoSADP, DoDAF products development, and SysML 
diagrams development (Figure 14) underlies the scope of the integrated methodology 
used in this research [21]. The SoSADP remains the starting point of the integrated 
methodology. A layer-to-layer mapping allows the DoDAF products in the DoDAF 
layers to capture the results from the SoSADP processes. The SysML diagrams in the 
four pillars of SysML—namely, Structure, Behavior, Requirements, and Parametrics—
capture the results of the SoSADP processes [3]. The mapping between the SoSADP 
processes and the SysML diagrams are not necessarily one-to-one. 
 
 
Figure 14.   The mapping between the SoSADP, DoDAF products, and SysML diagrams 
development. (From: [3].) 
Table 2 displays the various DoDAF products for an integrated, NCOW-
compliant SoS architecture that capture some of the results from the SoSADP and the 
SysML diagrams that represent the DoDAF products and the SoSADP results. The 




verification of the traceability between an SoS architecture and an executable model that 
represents the SoS architecture. Note that a blank space in Table 2 implies that there is no 
mapping among the entities of the SoSADP, DoDAF products, and SysML. 
Table 2.   The mapping between the SoSADP, DoDAF, and SysML diagrams for an 




This chapter discusses the integrated systems engineering methodology for 
analyzing systems of systems. The integrated systems engineering methodology 
integrates the SoSADP, DoDAF products development, and SysML diagrams 
development into a unified paradigm for analysis of SoS architectures. Each of the 
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methodology’s three components is described and examined in detail. The chapter 
concludes with a description of their interrelations and mapping between the SoSADP, 
DoDAF products, and SysML diagrams that will be used in the next chapter to produce 
representations of the SoS architecture alternatives.  
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IV. NCO MULTI-DOMAIN SOS ARCHITECTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Maritime domain awareness is an area of strong interest to the U.S. and its allies. 
This chapter applies the integrated systems engineering methodology to the design and 
assessment of conceptual coalition multi-domain awareness SoS architectures. Again, a 
multi-domain SoS provides open-ocean reconnaissance and surveillance to create a 
maritime domain COP to aid in decision making. Furthermore, this research simplifies 
the DoDAF products and sketches SysML diagrams pertaining to the assessment of the 
multi-domain awareness SoS architectures by modeling and simulation.  
B. MULTI-DOMAIN AWARENESS SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS 
The coalition multi-domain awareness SoS problem stated in Chapter II may be 
simplified as follows: architect an SoS consisting of capabilities, platforms, and sensors 
from coalition systems that will detect, track, and counter PAVs that potentially carry 
WMD in open-ocean transit, before reaching their seaports of destination. The multi-
domain SoS consists of current or future coalition systems. The coalition nations 
available for this research are the U.S., Australia, and Canada.  
The scope of this thesis is limited to the scenario defined in Chapter II. 
Intelligence information on suspicious container ships, along with their locations, is 
received by the Coalition Command and Control center (CC2C). Requests for 
information from various external sources, such as AIS, shipping companies, and 
weather, are sent and received via the coalition network. The CC2C issues orders (with 
initial threat data) to the coalition nation command and control (C2) centers via the 
coalition network to track and monitor MV Alpha as a PAV. The Australian C2 center 
communicates with its platforms and sensors via the Australian network, the United 
States C2 center communicates with its platforms and sensors via the United States 
network, and the Canadian C2 center communicates with its platforms and sensors via the 
Canadian network. Each C2 center uses its distributed sensors (national, organic, and 
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commercial) to monitor and track MV Alpha as a PAV. All data collected by the 
distributed sensors networks from each coalition nation is processed, formatted, and sent 
via the coalition network to the CC2C to be integrated and fused into a COP. The COP is 
then disseminated to each coalition nation C2 center, thus providing a common picture of 
shared operational information facilitating MDA. 
This research focuses only on the above portion of the scenario, while employing 
the operational view captured in Figure 15. This chapter discusses the application of the 
integrated systems engineering methodology to the analysis of a U.S.-Australia-Canada 
coalition multi-domain SoS architecture.  
 
 
Figure 15.   OV-1: The high-level operational concept of the coalition SoS. (From: [31].) 
The OV-1 product (Figure 15), the high-level operational concept of the coalition 
SoS, depicts a network of a Coalition C2 center located on land (Guam or Hawaii), an 
Australian C2 center located in Darwin, Australia, a Canadian C2 center located in 
Vancouver, the U.S. C2 center located on one of the U.S. ships, and the coalition 
platforms and their respective sensors (as described in Chapter II). The Australian  
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network connects the Australian C2 center with the Australian sensors. The Canadian 
network connects the Canadian C2 center with the Canadian sensors. The U.S. sensors 
and C2 center communicate via the U.S. C2 network. 
1. Context Diagram 
The context diagram (Figure 16) sets the context and boundaries for the multi-
domain awareness SoS. The context diagram depicts the top-level systems of the SoS. 
The <<system>> and <<external>> stereotypes help identify the multi-domain awareness 
SoS relative to its environment. The <<external>> elements, IntelInterface, ships (PAVs), 
ShipCompanies, Weather, and AISInterface, are considered to be external to the 
CoalitionMDASoS. The links, labeled X1 through X5, represent a connection between 
the CoalitionMDASoS and each <<external>> element. The connection may represent 
some type of an interaction such as data exchange or surveillance. In the multi-domain 
awareness SoS context diagram, the only connection that does not represent data 




Figure 16.   SysML context diagram corresponding to the DoDAF OV-1. 
2. Use Case Diagrams 
Figure 17 displays the use case diagram for the multi-domain awareness SoS 
problem description. Triggered by intelligence messages from ‘Intel Agency’ actor 
followed by ship manifests from ‘Ship Companies’ actor, AIS location reports from 
‘International Maritime Organization’ actor, and weather reports from ‘Weather Center’ 
actor, the coalition multi-domain awareness SoS performs a sequence of actions indicated 
by the use cases Receive & Process Intel, Receive & Process Ship Manifests, Fuse Intel 
& Ship Manifests, Receive & Process AIS Reports, Receive & Process Weather Reports, 
Process Coalition Sensor Reports & Status, Fuse Sensor, AIS & Weather Reports, Form 




Figure 17.   The use case diagram for the multi-domain awareness SoS problem 
description (DoDAF OV-1 and AV-1) 
Figure 18 shows the use case diagram for the Coalition C2. The additional actors 
are the Australian C2 center, the Canadian C2 center, and the U.S. C2 center, which all 
provide status and sensor reports to the coalition C2. The Form and Send Alert Messages 
use case is supported, through <<include>>, by the Process Intel, Process Ship Manifests, 
and Fuse Intel & Ship Manifests use cases. Likewise, the Formulate and Disseminate 
COP use case is supported by the Process AIS Reports, Process AUS/CAN/US Sensors 
Data, Process Weather Reports, Fuse Sensor Data & AIS Reports, and Identify & Track 





Figure 18.   The use case diagram for the ‘Coalition AUS-CAN-US C2’ (DoDAF OV-1 
and AV-1). 
3. Requirements Diagrams 
The requirements diagram is a SysML diagram type that shows requirements and 
their relationships to other model elements. For the purposes of illustrating the usage of 
the SysML requirements diagram, a notional concept of the requirements is developed for 
the Coalition MDA SoS. Figure 19 is the resulting requirements diagram. As a high-level 
view of the requirements specification, the requirements diagram shows the trace 
relationships among Coalition MDA SoS Requirements and a reference to a trade-off 




Figure 19.   SysML requirements diagram (DoDAF SV-4). 
The Coalition MDA SoS specification presumably consists of text requirements. 
The Coalition MDA SoS Requirements diagram includes the Coalition MDA SoS C2 
Specification requirements, functionality is denoted by the stereotype <<requirements>> 
Functionality, quantification is denoted by the stereotype <<requirements>> 
Quantification, and effectiveness is denoted by the stereotype <<requirements>> 
Effectiveness. There are flowdown requirements for each of the top-level requirements. 
As an example, there are five flowdown requirements for the stereotype 
<<requirements>> Functionality: IntelReceiveProcess, ShipManifestsReceiveProcess, 
Surveillance&Track, Fusion, and COP. Figure 19 only includes the requirement 
flowdown of two top-level requirements due to space considerations.  
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4. Activity Diagram 
The activity diagram for the Coalition MDA SoS depicts the functions that are 
performed by the various parts of the systems comprising the SoS. As shown in Figures 
20 and 21, the SysML activity diagrams allow modeling of the SoS at the functional 
level. The components of the coalition SoS perform the activities represented by the parts 
labeled with the functions they perform. The solid lines connecting the ports attached to 
the various parts show the connectivity and data flow. Both continuous and discrete flows 








Figure 21.   Part 2 of 2, SysML activity diagram (DoDAF OV-5 and OV-6c). 
5. Sequence Diagram 
The sequence diagram, an example of which is displayed in Figure 22, shows the 
data/message flows between the different blocks representing the systems within the 
Coalition MDA SoS and between the Coalition MDA SoS and the systems external to the 
Coalition MDA SoS. Upon receipt intelligence tip-off of PAVs and possibly ship 
manifests from ship companies, the coalition C2 disseminates command/alert messages 
on the coalition network to alert the Australian C2, Canadian C2, and the U.S. C2 centers. 
Through the Australian C2 network, the Australian C2 center then commands its AP-3C 
sensors to search for and track the PAVs. Through the Canadian C2 network, the 
Canadian C2 center commands the RADARSAT sensors to search for and track the 
PAVs. Through the U.S. C2 network, the U.S. C2 center commands U.S. sensors, both 
Global Hawk sensors and ship sensors, to search for and track the PAVs. Sensor data 
(track reports and status) are sent to and processed by each nation’s C2 center via its own 
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respective network. The three C2 centers then send status and processed sensor reports to 
the Coalition C2 center through the coalition network. The coalition C2 center then 
processes and fuses the sensor reports producing a COP, which is then sent out to the 





Figure 22.   SysML sequence diagram for Coalition MDA SoS C2 (DoDAF SV-1 and 
OV-6c). 
6. Block Breakdown Diagram 
Figure 23 shows a top-level SoS composition or the breakdown of the Coalition 
MDA SoS in terms of the blocks representing the systems of the SoS. The rest of the 
components in the diagram belong to the SoS and hence are defined using the 
<<system>> stereotypes. The composition graphical path, connection line with diamond 
end, indicates the direction of composition among blocks that are composed of other 




that compose the MDA SoS networks, four C2 centers that compose the Coalition MDA 
SoS C2, and the U.S. ship-based radars are from USS Ship 1 and USS Ship 2. The 




Figure 23.   SysML block breakdown diagram depicting composition of the coalition 
SoS (DoDAF OV-4). 
The SysML diagrams presented thus far give a broad representation of the 
Coalition MDA SoS. Alternative architectures are developed for this Coalition MDA 
SoS. 
C. MDA SOS ALTERNATIVE ARCHITECTURES 
The multi-domain awareness SoS concept seeks to exploit information from 
multiple sources and domains to deliver the situational awareness needed in the maritime 
domain. Due to the complexity of the MDA SoS, this study identifies and focuses on a 
system thread, which corresponds to the SysML sequence diagram in Figure 22. The 
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sequence diagram shows SoS interactions, analogous to a thread in a software system 
[33]. The SoS interactions begin with initial events from a starting point that trigger a 
flow of interactions, which prompts subsequent processes in the SoS until an ending point 
is reached. A further explanation of threads is provided in the simulative study described 
in Chapter V. 
Three architecture alternatives for a multi-domain awareness SoS are considered: 
a current architecture, a planned architecture using direct tasking, and a conceptual 
architecture using direct tasking and processing. Each alternative SoS architecture is now 
explained. 
1. Alternative Architecture #1—Current 
Figure 24 shows the connectivity of the first alternative SoS architecture. The 
oval shapes depict the different networks and the solid lines indicate the connections of 




Figure 24.   Connections among the different systems of the coalition MDA SoS in 
Architecture #1. 
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For example, the Australian AP-3C platform/sensors and the Australian C2 center 
communicate with each other via the Australian network. The Coalition C2 center 
communicates with each coalition nation C2 center via the coalition network. However, 
the Coalition C2 center cannot communicate directly to a coalition nation’s 
platforms/sensors without going through the respective host C2 center. Additionally, in 
this Coalition MDA SoS architecture, the raw data from coalition nation sensors must be 
processed in their respective nation C2 center before the processed sensor information is 
sent to the Coalition C2 center for fusion into the common operational picture.  
The sequence diagram for the first alternative SoS architecture (Figure 25) shows 
the data/message flows between the different blocks representing the systems within the 
Coalition MDA SoS and between the Coalition MDA SoS and the systems external to the 





Figure 25.   Architecture #1 SysML sequence diagram for Coalition MDA SoS C2. 
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The Coalition C2 center starts the process upon receipt of an intelligence warning 
message of a potential maritime attack from the Intelligence Community. The Coalition 
C2 center requests ship’s manifests of PAVs from commercial shipping companies. The 
AIS and weather data are requested depending on threat location. The Coalition C2 center 
disseminates command/alert messages via the coalition network alerting the Australian 
C2, Canadian C2, and the U.S. C2 centers. Through the Australian C2 network, the 
Australian C2 center then commands its AP-3C sensors to search for and track the PAVs. 
Through the Canadian C2 network, the Canadian C2 center commands the RADARSAT 
sensors to search for and track the PAVs. Through the U.S. C2 network, the U.S. C2 
center commands U.S. sensors, both Global Hawk sensors and ship sensors, to search for 
and track the PAVs. Sensor data (track reports and status) are sent to and processed by 
each nation’s respective C2 center via its own network. The coalition nation C2 centers 
then send status and processed sensor reports to the Coalition C2 center via the coalition 
network. The Coalition C2 center then fuses the status and sensor reports to produce a 
COP, which is then disseminated to each coalition nation C2 center. The individual C2 
centers will use the COP in their response to the PAVs. The thread ends once the COP is 
disseminated and received by all C2 centers. 
2. Alternative C2 Architecture #2—Planned 
The second alternative SoS architecture (Figure 26) is similar to alternative 
Architecture #1, except the Coalition C2 center can communicate direct tasking 
assignments to a coalition nation’s platforms/sensors without going through the 
respective host C2 center. This communication flow is one-way only and the raw data 
from a tasked coalition nation’s sensor must still be processed by its respective nation C2 
center before the processed sensor information is sent to the Coalition C2 center for 
fusion. The new communication link is the curved line labeled as “direct tasking,” with 





Figure 26.   Connections among the different systems of the Coalition MDA SoS in 
Architecture #2. 
The accompanying sequence diagram for the second alternative SoS architecture 
(Figure 27) shows the data/message flows between the different blocks as described in 
the first alternative architecture. However, the key difference is the direct tasking 
sequence from the Coalition C2 center to each platform/sensor, as well as the 
informational notification to the respective coalition nation C2 centers. The thread in 
Figure 27 is implemented in modeling during the simulative study.  
The Coalition C2 center starts the process upon receipt of an intelligence warning 
message of a potential maritime attack from the Intelligence Community. The Coalition 
C2 center requests ship’s manifests of PAVs from commercial shipping companies. The 
AIS and weather data are requested depending on threat location. The Coalition C2 center 
issues specific tasking orders on the coalition network to the available coalition 
platforms/sensors to search for and track PAVs. At the same time, alert messages and 
tasking orders (for information purposes) are sent to the Australian C2, Canadian C2, and 
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the U.S. C2 centers. Even though the platforms/sensors are directly tasked by the 
Coalition C2 center, all sensor data (track reports and status) are still sent to and 
processed by each coalition nation’s C2 center via its own network. The coalition nation 
C2 centers then send status and processed sensor reports to the Coalition C2 center via 
the coalition network. The Coalition C2 center fuses the status and sensor reports to 
produce a COP, which is then disseminated to each coalition nation C2 center. The 
individual C2 centers will use the COP in their response to the PAVs. The thread ends 




Figure 27.   Architecture #2 SysML sequence diagram for Coalition MDA SoS C2. 
3. Alternative C2 Architecture #3—Conceptual 
The third SoS architecture alternative (Figure 28) is similar to alternative 
Architecture #2, except that the coalition platforms/sensors have two-way 
communications with the Coalition C2 center. As shown in Figure 28, the Coalition C2 
center has the capability to process sensor data obtained directly from the sensors; the 
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sensor data thus need not be processed by the respective host C2 center. This alternative 
architecture eliminates the need for data processing at the coalition nation C2 centers in 
the MDA SoS. The raw sensor data is subsequently processed by the Coalition C2 center 
and fused into a COP. A two-way communication link is a double-headed curved line 




Figure 28.   Connections among the different systems of the coalition MDA SoS in 
Architecture #3. 
The sequence diagram for the third SoS architecture alternative (Figure 29) shows 
the data/message flows between the different blocks as described in the first and second 
alternative architectures. However, the key difference is the direct tasking and reporting 
sequence from the Coalition C2 center to each platform/sensor. Notification of tasking is 
still given to the respective coalition nation C2 centers. The thread in Figure 29 is 
implemented in modeling during the simulative study. 
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The Coalition C2 center starts the process upon receipt of an intelligence warning 
message of a potential maritime attack from the Intelligence Community. The Coalition 
C2 center requests ship’s manifests of PAVs from commercial shipping companies. The 
AIS and weather data are requested depending on threat location. The Coalition C2 center 
issues specific tasking orders on the coalition network to the available coalition 
platforms/sensors to search for and track PAVs. At the same time, alert messages and 
tasking orders (for information purposes) are sent to the partner nation C2 centers. All 
sensor data (track reports and status) from tasked platforms/sensors are sent to and 
processed by the Coalition C2 center via the coalition network. The Coalition C2 center 
then processes the sensor data, fuses the status and sensor reports, and produces a COP. 
The COP is then disseminated to each partner nation C2 center. The individual C2 
centers will use the COP in their response to the PAVs. The thread ends once the COP is 




Figure 29.   Architecture #3 SysML sequence diagram for Coalition MDA SoS C2. 
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D. SUMMARY 
The integrated systems engineering methodology, discussed in Chapter III, is 
applied to the coalition multi-domain awareness SoS problem. The SysML diagrams are 
developed as a representation of the coalition MDA SoS architecture. The selection of 
three alternative SoS architectures then follows. The three alternative SoS architectures 
focus on a system thread corresponding to the developed SysML sequence diagram. The 
sequence diagram shows SoS interactions that begin with an initial event that triggers a 
flow of interactions until an ending point is reached. The three alternative SoS 
architectures will be evaluated in the simulative study.  
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V. SIMULATIVE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The simulative study, a cornerstone of the SoS Architecture Development 
Process, provides quantitative measures by which to assess the effectiveness of the 
alternative SoS architectures. In this simulative study, assessing the effectiveness of the 
alternative SoS architectures amounts to answering the following questions: 
• How much time does it require to establish a COP? 
• What is the probability of COP accuracy? 
A coalition multi-domain awareness SoS must deliver a timely and accurate COP 
to support maritime domain awareness. The purpose is to quantify the best SoS 
performance among the alternative SoS architectures: the current, planned, and 
conceptual. Modeling and simulation is used to aid in answering these questions.  
B. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
Modeling is a powerful tool used to analyze, design, and operate complex 
systems. Models, logical descriptions of how systems perform, are used to assess 
processes too complex to analyze via spreadsheets or flowcharts. Simulation involves 
designing a model of a system and conducting experiments on it “to determine how the 
real system performs and to predict the effect of changes to the system as time 
progresses” [32].  
1. ExtendTM Model Development 
ExtendTM simulation software is used to develop the Coalition MDA SoS C2 
model for this simulative study. The simulative study focuses on the system thread that 
corresponds to the SysML sequence diagram elucidated in Chapter IV.  
Three ExtendTM models are created, implementing the sequence diagrams for 
each MDA SoS alternative. In each simulation, the SoS interactions begin with an initial 
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event from a starting point that triggers a flow of interactions, which prompt subsequent 
processes in the SoS until an ending point is reached. The starting point for each 
alternative SoS architecture model is the Intel element, which initiates an intelligence 
warning alert/message to the Coalition C2 center. The ending point for each alternative 
SoS model is the point at which the COP is disseminated and received by each of the 
coalition C2 centers.  
The ExtendTM models for the simulative study are designed specifically to depict 
the flow of messages and data that traverse the coalition C2 network for each of the three 
SoS architecture alternatives. The ExtendTM models capture the alternative MDA SoS 
SysML sequence diagrams in three executable models. The components of the MDA SoS 
models are now described in detail.  
a. Network Model 
Figure 30 depicts the top-level module of the coalition C2 network, which 
is the same for all SoS architecture alternatives. The coalition C2 network model 
leverages ExtendTM’s strong hierarchical capabilities, where layers of components are 
further encapsulated for modularity and organization. For example, encapsulated under 
the top-level module component known as ‘coalition network’ are the constructs of the 
network shown in Figure 31.  
 
 




Figure 31.   Coalition C2 network modular constructs. 
b. Nodes 
There are eighteen connectors on the ExtendTM coalition C2 network 
model; however, only twelve connectors are needed for these models. Each of the twelve 
nodes, which represent the MDA SoS elements, is attached to a connector on the network 
model. Table 3 shows the SoS elements and their corresponding nodes in the top-level 
view in Figure 30. 
Table 3.   List of SoS elements and corresponding nodes in the Coalition MDA SoS 
model. 
SoS Element Node Number 
Intelligence 13 
Ship Companies 1 
AIS 2 
Weather 3 
Coalition C2 Center 5 
Common Operational Picture 4 
Australian C2 Center 10 
Australian Sensors 6 
Canadian C2 Center 11 
Canadian Sensors 7 
United States C2 Center 12 
United States Sensors 8 
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Each SoS element in the ExtendTM model contains layers of components 
further encapsulated for modularity purposes. For example, Figure 32 shows part of the 
Coalition C2 Center element corresponding to node five. The model shown in Figure 32 




Figure 32.   Part of the Coalition C2 center element’s message routing decision logic 
blocks. 
Each of the twelve nodes, which represent the SoS elements, have similar 
message routing and sorting decision blocks, as well as message creation and 
acknowledgment creation blocks. Figure 33 illustrates how ExtendTM models may have 
embedded blocks in their models. The highest layer in Figure 33 is the Network Node. 
Each block circled in red is opened to show its contents. The contents of the Message 
Creation block shows it has a Create Msg Attributes block. The Create Msg Attributes 
block is opened and shows it contains blocks used to create the attributes of the messages, 
which will be eventually sent out of this SoS element Node. Some of the message 





Figure 33.   Hierarchical structure breakdown of the Network Node module, showing the 
Message creation and Create Msg Attributes modules. 
Following is the list of other particulars and assumptions of this Coalition 
MDA SoS ExtendTM model: 
• The message size varies according to the type of messages. This model 
uses two main message sizes, Orders/Requests/processed data messages of 
40,000 bytes and raw sensor data messages of 400,000 bytes. 
• ACK messages are also modeled. Some ACK messages are virtual in the 
sense that they are not acknowledging messages, but are used to enable 
simultaneous dissemination of a message. Virtual (ACK) messages keep 
the flow of the model without incurring any delay. 
• A message is characterized by its size, its originator, its destination, and its 
priority. 
• All nodes function in full-duplex mode. 
• Every node is connected to the communication network, which is modeled 
as a LIFO (last in, first out) queue with a constant data rate. 
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• The model is conducive to Monte Carlo simulation. 
• Simulations results can be used for post-processing. 
The purpose of this simulative study is to compare the MDA SoS 
architecture alternatives; therefore, the relative performance of each architecture 
alternative is of importance, not the detailed numbers used in the construction of the 
model. 
2. Simulation Design 
System interactions can be understood by modeling each system in terms of 
objects corresponding to system elements, with the proper logical flow and timing of 
items of interest passed between system elements during interactions. Passing of items 
from one model object to another is analogous to passing messages between objects in 
SysML diagrams, such as the sequence diagram. In general, the measures of performance 
of such system of systems include time to complete a thread—such as accomplishing a 
complex task, or the throughput of items through the total system [33]. Depending on 
how the model is constructed, another measure of performance could be the quality of the 
messages or final outputs. In this simulative study, both time to establish a COP and the 
probability of COP accuracy are used as measures of performance. 
a. Time to Establish Common Operating Picture 
The first measure of performance is time to establish a COP. Again, each 
simulation begins with an initial event that triggers all subsequent processes in the SoS 
thread until an ending point is reached. The starting point for a thread is an intelligence 
warning alert/message from Intelligence to the Coalition C2 center. The ending point for 
this thread is the time when the COP is disseminated and received at each coalition nation 
C2 center. The time to COP completion is the difference between the start time of the 
initial event (Intel) and the end time of the final event (COP received by all C2 centers).  
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b. Common Operating Picture Accuracy 
The second measure of performance is probability of COP accuracy, 
denoted by P. Let iP  denote the probability of accuracy of the data from the i
th coalition 
sensor or coalition C2 center.  In practice, raw sensor data and/or processed sensor are 
combined to form a COP. The accuracy of the COP thus depends on that of the raw 
sensor data and/or processed sensor data. Since this research does not deal with actual 
raw or processed data from coalition sensors or C2 centers, a probabilistic model of the 
COP and data accuracy is used. Specifically, the data accuracy from each sensor or C2 
center is assumed to follow a uniform distribution, U(0,1), and the probability of COP 
accuracy is evaluated according to the following simplistic pooling, 
( )max iiP P= ,      (1) 
where i denotes the thi  source of data. 
As seen later in this thesis, 1, 2,3i =  for Architectures #1 and #2, and 
1, ,5i = "  for Architecture #3. In Architectures #1 and #2, 1 refers to Australia C2 center, 
2 to Canada C2 center, and 3 to the U.S. C2 center. In Architecture #3, i refers to the total 
number of sensors in the SoS. 
3. Experiment Design and Output 
A concern in experimenting with a simulation model for large, complex, 
interconnected systems is the model’s inherent variability. The design of experiments for 
this simulative study gathers data from 500 simulation runs for each MDA SoS 
architecture alternative. Figure 34 shows an example of ExtendTM time data produced by 
the simulation runs. The time data is divided into three columns. Column one shows the 
finish time of the thread, column two shows the start time of the thread, and column three 
shows the difference between the start and finish times of the thread. The data in the third 





Figure 34.   ExtendTM model showing collected time outputs for each run. Column one 
shows finish time, column two shows start time, and column three shows the 
difference between start and finish times. 
The data produced from 500 simulation runs are processed to yield the two 
measures of performance; namely, the time to establish a COP and the probability of 
COP accuracy, which will aid in answering the two questions stated in this chapter.  
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C. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
1. Time to Establish a Common Operational Picture 
Again, the time to establish a COP is measured as the difference between the start 
time of the initial event and the end time of the final event of a thread. A descriptive 
statistical analysis is performed on the simulation results, specifically the time needed to 
complete the sequence of events in the thread (data recorded in column three of Figure 
34). Figure 35 compares the statistical results corresponding to the MDA SoS 
architecture alternatives. 
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Figure 35.   Bar graph displaying the time to establish a COP for MDA SoS architecture 
alternatives. 
Architecture #1, the current architecture, takes the longest time to establish 
a COP, with a mean time of 818 seconds. Architecture #2, the planned architecture, takes 
an average time of 779 seconds establishes a COP, which is 4.7% faster than that of the 
current architecture. The conceptual architecture, Architecture #3, establishing a COP 
with a mean time of 739 seconds, shows almost a 10% improvement over the current 
architecture. The MDA SoS architecture that performs best, by taking the least amount of 
time to establish a COP, is thus Architecture #3. 
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2. Probability of Common Operational Picture Accuracy 
For Architectures #1 and #2, with inputs from the three coalition nation C2 
centers—Australia, Canada, and U.S. —using equation (1) and averaging the results from 
500 simulation runs result in the probability of COP accuracy of roughly 0.75. For 
Architecture #3, with inputs from the five sensors—the Australian AP-3C sensor, the 
Canadian RADARSAT-2 sensor, the U.S. Global Hawk sensor, the U.S. Ship 1 sensor, 
and the U.S. Ship 2 sensor—again using equation (1) and averaging the results from 500 
runs results in probability of COP accuracy of approximately 0.83. Figure 36 compares 
the accuracy results corresponding to the MDA SoS architecture alternatives. 
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Figure 36.   Bar graph displaying the probability of COP accuracy for MDA SoS 
architecture alternatives. 
The first two architectures have the same probability since both 
architecture alternatives have the same number of data inputs forming the COP. 
Architecture #3, with a probability of COP accuracy of approximately 0.83, shows almost 
a 10% improvement over Architectures #1 and #2. The MDA SoS architecture alternative 
with the highest probability of COP accuracy is Architecture #3. 
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3. Conclusion 
Based on the results of the two measures of performance, the best alternative 
MDA SoS architecture is Architecture #3. Architecture #3’s time to establish COP is 
10% faster than that of Architecture #1 and 5% faster than that of Architecture #2. 
Additionally, Architecture #3’s probability of COP accuracy is higher than those of both 
Architectures #1 and #2. Based on the two tested measures of performance, the MDA 
SoS architecture alternative’s ranking, in a decreasing order, are: Architecture #3, 
Architecture #2, and Architecture #1. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter describes the simulative study using modeling and simulation. It 
describes the use of the ExtendTM simulation software employed in this research to 
develop the alternative MDA SoS architecture models. The development of the models 
and the experiment design are then described in detail. A statistical analysis is performed 
on the ExtendTM simulation results to identify the best-performance SoS architecture for 
each measure of performance. Architecture #3 is found to be the best architecture, taking 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the conclusions, key findings, and areas for future research. 
Section B summarizes the research. Section C captures the key findings. Section D 
discusses areas for future research. Finally, Section E concludes the thesis. 
B. RESEARCH SUMMARY 
The research conducted in this thesis applies a systems engineering approach to 
answering the research question: What is the best NCO SoS architecture for MDA? This 
question shapes the research and analysis accomplished in this thesis.  
The research begins by defining the multi-domain awareness problem, 
background, the coalition multi-domain awareness SoS problem statement, and scenario. 
It then applies the integrated systems engineering methodology for analyzing and ranking 
SoS architectures [3] to the coalition multi-domain awareness SoS problem. SysML 
diagrams are developed to represent three coalition multi-domain awareness SoS 
architectures, which are evaluated in the simulative study using modeling and simulation. 
ExtendTM software is used to develop the alternative MDA SoS architecture models for 
the simulative study. The experiment design is then performed to evaluate the MDA SoS 
architecture alternatives. The simulation results are processed to produce the measures of 
performance for each MDA SoS architecture alternative, which are the time to establish 
COP and the probability of COP accuracy. A statistical analysis is then conducted on the 
results to determine the best MDA SoS architecture. The best MDA SoS architecture 
provides the most accurate COP in the least time. 
C. KEY FINDINGS 
The key findings from the research conducted in this thesis follow. 
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In general, in a highly distributed network, which is the backbone of net-centric 
operations, the resulting connectivity of the network would allow direct or assured 
communications with reduced delay between any two nodes of the network, provided that 
there is no bottleneck resulting from lack of sufficient bandwidth on any communications 
link.  In particular, in the distributed network of Architecture #3, direct links between the 
sensors and the coalition C2 center shorten the communications delay, and hence, reduce 
the time to establish a COP. 
The integrated systems engineering methodology for analyzing SoS architectures 
provides an effective framework and tool for designing and analyzing complex SoS in 
general and NCO MDA SoS in particular. Architecture representations using SysML 
activity and sequence diagrams aid in identifying and resolving some modeling and SoS 
interoperability issues, such as communications and concepts of operations. Furthermore, 
modeling the threads (i.e., sequences of events), based on these SysML diagrams, aids in 
understanding the NCO MDA SoS behavior. Finally, the simulative study has been found 
to be an effective tool for assessing the performance of the SoS architectures and for 
ranking the SoS architectures. 
D. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Multi-domain awareness has emerged as a high priority mission area for the 
Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security. The problem 
scenario, assumptions, and results of this research reflect only an instance of a complex 
MDA problem. All of the models employed in this research are created with variable 
inputs that can be changed to suit other situations or scenarios. The approach and analysis 
used in this research, coupled with the adaptability of the models, provide future 
researchers with a tool to use for future analysis of NCO multi-domain awareness 
systems of systems. 
In light of the possibility of terrorist activities, accidents, and natural disasters, the 
multi-domain awareness problem addressed in this thesis spawns a number of areas for 
future study and research, such as: 
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• Architecting an NCO SoS architecture that integrates current capabilities 
and legacy systems into an interoperable organization of sensors, data, 
information, intelligence, and dissemination tools and processes for a 
national MDA capability. 
• Applying space-based radar specifically for open-ocean coverage and 
integrating the space-based radar data with AIS to identify anomalous 
activity as a means for cueing less costly surveillance assets. 
• Developing resource allocation and optimization algorithms for cost 
effective use of sensors and processing resources. 
• Implementing a simulation to assess an optimal number and type of 
sensors to determine their impact on the performance of an NCO MDA 
SoS. 
• Implementing a simulation to assess the SoS impact and performance in 
various geographic areas and environments. 
• Assessing the distributed or common operational picture capabilities 
among MDA fusion centers and existing national and regional fusion 
centers in order to improve their combined capabilities in a joint or 
coalition MDA mission. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This thesis applies the integrated systems engineering methodology for analyzing 
architectures of SoS [3] for multi-domain awareness. The integrated systems engineering 
methodology, developed at the Naval Postgraduate School, involves linking the SoSADP 
to the DoDAF products, using SysML diagrams to represent and model DoDAF products, 
and hence, to model the SoS architectures, and linking the SysML diagrams to SoSADP 
via executable simulation models. Focusing on an NCO multi-domain awareness SoS 
architecture, this research selects the best SoS architecture through applying the 
integrated systems engineering methodology with an exploratory application to analysis 
of a coalition MDA SoS C2 architecture employed to aid in countering terrorism 
emanating from the maritime domain.  
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